

TreeKEM: A Modular Machine-Checked Symbolic Security Analysis of Group Key Agreement in Messaging Layer Security



MLS



Théophile Wallez, *Inria Paris*
Jonathan Protzenko, *Microsoft Azure Research*
Karthikeyan Bhargavan, *Cryspen*



What is Messaging Layer Security (MLS)

Secure group messaging



Signal



WhatsApp

[matrix]

. . .

Secure group messaging




Signal



WhatsApp

[matrix]

...



Secure group messaging



Signal



WhatsApp

[matrix]

...

Forward secrecy

secure



compromise

time

Secure group messaging



Signal




WhatsApp

[matrix]

...

Forward secrecy

Post-compromise security



Secure group messaging




Signal




WhatsApp

[matrix]

...



State of the art, before MLS




N devices

$O(N^2)$ Signal channels!

Slow for large N , e.g. $N \simeq 1000$


State of the art, before MLS



N devices

$O(N^2)$ Signal channels!


Slow for large N, e.g. $N \simeq 1000$



Design constraints:
Secure, efficient, asynchronous, dynamic
groups


Prior work: Modularizing MLS

("TreeSync: ...", USENIX Security '23)



Prior work: Modularizing MLS

("TreeSync: ...", USENIX Security '23)



Our contributions

A security theorem for TreeKEM


Yes, TreeKEM does guarantee*:

- ▶ add security
- ▶ remove security
- ▶ forward secrecy
- ▶ post-compromise security


*

~~~~~  
~~~~~  
~~~~~  
~~~~~  
~~~~~

# Symbolic analysis on bit-precise, interoperable specifications



# Symbolic analysis on bit-precise, interoperable specifications



# Improving MLS deployment policies

Our security theorem always implies:

- ▶ add security
- ▶ remove security

And implies (assuming deployment policies we specify):

- ▶ forward secrecy
- ▶ post-compromise security

Some of these deployment policies were missing from the MLS architecture document, we notified the working group.



# Conclusion

Our contributions:

- ▶ prove the security of TreeKEM in the symbolic model
- ▶ do proofs on an bit-precise, executable, interoperable specification
- ▶ help the MLS Working Group to improve the architecture document

Future work: security proofs for TreeDEM, prove efficient implementations.

`</> https://github.com/Inria-Prosecco/treekem-artifact`

✉ theophile.wallez@inria.fr

🌐 <https://www.twal.org/>

🦋 @twal.org